I. Introduction
An initial public offering is the unseasoned offering whose secondary market does not exist. Consequently secondary market price is lacking. The determination of the offer price, in an initial public offering, is shrouded in secrecy in Kenya. The offer price is the monetary offer of ordinary shares that a private firm make to the public for the first time. Lowry and Schwert (2001) state that pricing of initial public offering start before the setting of offer price. The issuer and the underwriter make the setting of the offer price, in an Initial public offering. The issuer and the underwriter maintain secrecy is setting the offer price. Busaba and Chang (2009) posit that the most applied methods of arriving at an offer price, in an initial public offering, were book building and fixed price. In the fixed price, the offer price is made without soliciting information from investors, unlike in the book building. This study explore the theories that explain the method used to determine the offer price in the Kenyan equity market. Extant literature on initial public offerings in Kenya focus on the initial and long run returns. This study explore the period before initial public offering filing.
Ghosh, Petrova, Feng, ans Pattanapanchai (2012) state that partial adjustment theory alludes that initial return of IPOs is determined by private information since public information is available to all market actors. In contrast, they posit that prospect theory assume that both private and public information is not fully incorporated in the offer price. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) conclude that companies with greater price uncertainty and risk prefer fixed price while companies with greater need for funds apply book building. The same writers aver that when markets are pessimistic, fixed IPO offer prices are used. However, when markets are optimistic, auction is used. The overriding question in this study was why is the pricing of IPO in Kenya made in secrecy? Pollock and Rindova (2003) state that media provided information affects prices of firms going public. They conclude that informediaries enhance investor exposure to information through framing the information positively or negatively, leading to endowment and disposition effects. However, Booth and Smith (1986) posit that underwriters are influenced by certification hypothesis in setting the offer price. In the same vein, to undertake their marketing role of IPOs, underwriters set low prices to induce demand for the shares offered. Furthermore, Tinic (1988) underwriters set prices to avoid legal suits due to overpricing. This view was supported by Ibbotson(1975) . This explains why IPOs are sold at a discount. Baron (1986) state that informed investors crowd out the other investors when good issues are priced at the expected values. However, informed investors keep away from bad issues. To ensure that less informed investors stay in the market, the IPOs are priced at a discount. According to Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) investors who buy shares first set the stage for subsequent investors. Therefore underwriters price IPO at a discount so as to attract more investors. Ritter (1984) connects pricing with ex ante uncertainity on the value of the shares. Due to this uncertainity on the value of the shares, underwriters compensate investors for bearing risk. But Mauer and Senbet (1992) aver that inomplete spanning of the primary issues in the secondary market and limited investor access influence pricing. The pricing differences of IPOs is a result of two distinct markets.The offer price being determined in the primary market while the closing price being created in the secondary market. (2005) posits that institutional investors present non-binding bids to an underwriter of IPO shares. The underwriter apply the bids to estimate the size of demand of IPO shares and on the strength od edemand set the offer price. Therefore bookbuilding is a process of creating the IPO market through discovering demand of the IPO shares. Sherman(2005) contends that bookbuilding reduces the risk of both issuers and investors due to direct control by the underwriters. The underwiters use the bookbuilding to create incetives to potential investors. Consequently, bookbuilding minimize overpricing of IPOs. Irrespective of whether IPO pricing is an auction or bookbuilding, it results into a fixed price. Benveniste(1989) posits that investment bankers set offer prices to induce asymmetrically informed investors to bid for the IPO offer.
II. Literature Review
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In Germany, Aussenegg, Pichler, and Stomper (2006) opine that the grey market or the when issued trading occur before the first day of trading. The grey market reveals information on the offer price in the same way as the bookbuilt initial public offering. Such trading take place in the off market through the brokers. In kenya, such market does not exist due to institutional framework created by the regulator.
III. Kenyan Case
Kaaria and Moronge (2013) found that pricing factors that influence firms going public were offer price, efficient capital markets and market performance. However they proposed that to succeed, IPO firms should consider timing, governance issues, offer price and cost of going public. IPO firms listed in Nairobi Securities Exchange use the fixed price approach. The offer price is the product of the earnings per share and the price earnings ratio of the industry. Determination of the offer price has been held in secrecy causing Capital Markets Authority to institute a legal framework to support the pricing of IPOs in Kenya. Based on schedule 1, it is apparent that these prices were determined through multiplying the earnings per share against the price earnings ratio for each IPO. The researcher obtained the Earnings Per Share from the financial statements located in capital markets Authority library. There was no organized price earnings ratio. The result of the multiplication of the EPS and P/ER would reveal the estimated IPO offer price. The absence of the price earnings ratio means that various IPO firms applied mechanisms unique to themselves. Hence the existence of secrecy in the determination of the offer price in initial public offerings in kenya.is compared with the offer prices, derived from the prospectuses.
IV. Methodology
The study adopted an explanatory and causal design. The study reveal whether earnings per share of an IPO firm explains the offer price of its IPO. The offer prices of the targeted population were obtained from IPO prospectuses filed at Capital Markets Authority library, the regulator of capital markets in Kenya. The earnings per share data was obtained from the published financial statements of the IPO firms. The financial statements were, also, filled in the CMA library. Both the offer prices and the earnings per share were measured in Kenya shillings. Thus, complying with the ratio measurement scales. The offer prices were regressed against the earnings per share. The adjusted R2 and the P-values were obtained and interpreted. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of offer price and earnings per share. The mean of offer price and earnings per share was ksh 17.24 and ksh 1.72, respectively.
V. Results And Findings
Descriptive statistics
Normality test for Offer price (PO) -dependent variable.
The dependent variable violated normality assumption as seen in the normality test Tabe 2 and figure 1. Table 2 shows Kolmogorov Smirmov normality test for the offer price. The findings reveal that offer price was significant at 0.05 level of significance, thus violating normality assumption for a parametric test. Consequently, log transformation was applied to lead to normality of the offer price. Figure 1 shows a histogram and a normality plot for the offer price. It reveals that the offer price was not normally distributed. Hence the need to transform the data, using logarithms. Table 3 shows Kolmogorov Smirnov test of normality for log offer price. The findings was that log offer price fitted a normal distribution thus correcting for the violation of normality assumption. Figure 2 shows a histogram and a normality plot for the log offer price. It reveals that Log offer price was normally distributed. Table 4 shows Pearson correlation coefficient to assess a linear relationship between log earning per share (EPS) and log offer price (PO). The findings reveal that there is a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between log offer price and log earning per share. A simple linear regression analysis was performed with Offer Price (PO) as the dependent variable and the earning per share (EPS) as the independent variable. The findings reveal that coefficient of determination was zero. Therefore, the earnings per share explain none of the change in the offer price. Furthermore, there was a statistically insignificant relationship at 0.05 level of significance between log of offer price and log of earning per share, t=0.031; p=0.975. The resultant regression equation was as follows: Log offer price (PO) = 2.553 + 0.004* log EPS
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VI. Conclusion
The study concludes that earnings per share fail to predict the offer price of initial public offerings. It is, further, concluded that the application of price earnings ratio too estimate the offer price is equally flawed because earnings per share is an input in the price earnings ratio. 
